Ladies and Gentlemen:

The centennial anniversary of the lossof the USS F-1 occurs on Sunday, 17 December 2017. This is importantin the history of the US Naval Submarine Force as it is the firstloss of a US submarine during a declared war. Being so it thenshould be remembered that there are fifty three US submarines lostduring wartime not the fifty two that only counts those lost duringthe US involvement in World War Two. For the past seventy sevenyears the history of our force has been remembered wrong. It is timefor that egregious error be corrected.

It has been said to me by way ofargument that the loss of F-1 was only an accident. This is true butso also were the losses of USS S-28, USS S-36, USS S-39 and R-12.

It has been said to me by way ofargument that the loss of F-1 was not in a 'combat zone'. The westcoast of the US was as much of a combat zone as the waters off Hawaiiin 1944 and the waters off Key West in June of 1943.

These two arguments also logicallyargue that S-28 and R-12 should be removed from the list of fifty twosubmarines lost in World War Two. This then would need a revision ofhistory to reflect the number of wartime US submarine losses to aneven fifty.

Rather than be exclusive it would seemto be a better way to remember the sacrifices of our submarinesailors to be inclusive. Thus the actual number of wartime losses inthe US Naval Submarine Force should be fifty three.

The details of the loss of F-1 aredescribed below:

The US Navy's First Wartime SubmarineLoss

The distance from San Pedro Bay to LaJolla in California is roughly 75 nautical miles.  A courseconnecting Point Fermin, the southern point of the Palos Verde Hillswith Point Loma is 142°T, The reciprocal then would be 322°T. To transit between these two points, one would go south on 142° andto come back one would steer 322°  

In a smooth sea the F-Class submarinecould make the trip in about 8 hours at just less than 10 knots.  Naval Instructions require that ships perform and engineering test todetermine both the stamina of a ship and her capabilities.  Bothmust be known to plan strategy.  The test for submarines was torun at a constant standard speed for 48 hours.  The test wouldsee how far the ship could go in the requisite time.  Slowing orstopping for repairs would count against the ship's performance andreflect poorly on the ship and crew.  The best a ship could do,then, was to maintain a constant fairly high speed for the entiretime.  To do a 48 hour engineering test would require six tripsfor the F-boats, three south from San Pedro toward San Diego and three back to the north..

In December 1917, the USS F-1, USS F-3and USS F-2 found themselves making just such a test.  In thefive months since the United States entered World War I on the sideof the Allied Powers, the US Naval Submarine Force had been thrustinto an unfamiliar role.  Instead of combating enemy fleetstrying to force our coast, they boats were performing anti-submarinewarfare patrols off the east coast of the US and off the Azores. There was little threat to the west coast so the remaining boatsthere were mostly holding training exercises.

The F-class submarine was designed inthe early 1900s  when the role of the submarine was still verymuch in its infancy.  Electric Boat offered the General Boardseveral designs in 1909.  These were the EB-18, EB-19 andEB-20.  They were variations on the theme put forth by EB in itsC and D Classes.  Slightly longer than the D Class, EB-18 usedgasoline engines for propulsion and had one more periscope.  TheEB-19 design was essentially the same, but with diesel engines. Both were too slow, the board required 14kts the -18 and -19 designswere rejected.  The EB-20 design came in two varieties, dieseland gasoline. 

Only the diesel powered EB-20B wouldmake the requisite 14 kts. It was be accepted and four boats werebuilt, all  on the west coast.  These for boats  wouldbe the F-class, USS F-1, USS F-2, USS F-3 and USS F-4.

The class were all single hulled boatswith circular sections laid along the same axis.  Their lengthoverall was 142'-6".  Their beam was a mere 15'-5". The hull was divided into three compartments;  the torpedo roomwith the breech ends of the four 18 inch torpedo tubes,  thecontrol room with the operators for the ballast control valves(Kingstons), hydroplanes and periscopes,  and the engine roomwith two diesel engines their dynamos and shafting. The dieselengines of the F-class couldn't be reversed so shaft reversal (orbacking down)  took a bit of time.  The engine had to beshut down, the clutch between the engine and the main motordisengaged then the main motor started in the astern direction.  The two 390 horsepower diesel engines were connected by a clutch andcommon shaft to 310 horsepower motors which could be used asgenerators for battery charging.  The battery was a collectionof 120 Excide cells in rubber lined steel jars.  The cells wereopen topped and prone to leak acid into the bilge space under them. The diesels were generally unreliable and required constantmaintenance.  The motors were of the open yoke type and weresuceptable to  electrical grounding in the damp atmosphere ofthe engine/motor room.  The F-class and the sister class, the E,were the first EB boats to have bow planes.   The fledglingsubmarine fleet also had the first shipboard radios on submarines. Those in the F boats were made by Finekey.  (One wonders if thatis the origin of the colloquial term that means hard to maintain).

The class was involved in severalincidents, not all good.  F-2 had set a record on a dive on 5September 1912 when she went to a depth of 283 feet, some 83 feetbelow her test depth"(breaking the G-1's record 256').  LtJames B. Howell, her CO was censured for the test. 

F-4 failed to come up after a routinedive off Honolulu harbor on  15 March 1915.  It was thefirst time the US Navy had lost a submarine and its crew.  Greatefforts were made to reach the ship and rescue the crew, but she wasin 300 feet of water and there was no hope.  The hull wasfinally raised the next year.  Investigation determined that thecause of the sinking was a structural failure of the forward batterywell due to acid leakage from the batteries.  This sulfuric acidelectrolyte had, over a period of time, caused heavy corrosion ofrivets on tank seams which, in their weakened state failed and causedflooding of the ship.  The hull was eventually placed in a deeptrench some 40 feet off wharf position Serria-14  on the northside of the submarine base at Pearl Harbor where she still resides.

F-2  ran into the underside of akelp barge in August 1917, tearing off the radio antenna and theupper section of #1 scope.  In October, the H-1 smacked the F-2as the former came alongside.  Hitting along frame 55, H-1started rivets and opened seams for 40 to 50:" above thewaterline along an area between frames 56 and 39.  Then inNovember, K-7 hit F-2 forward and started rivets from frame 10 to14.  All these insults had been repaired by mid December. They seemed to be sturdy boats and with the exception of F-4, safeboats.

Fog is a common factor off theCalifornia coast in winter.  The plan for the engineering runincluded contingency of turning to seaward in case of running intorestricted visibility.  The engineering run started on themorning of 17 December 1917.  The first leg was a run to thesouth  with a course reversal with La Jolla light abeam toport.  The three ships formed a rough line abreast  andstarted south.  The engines were running smoothly at abour 292RPM.  The engines were direct drive to the screw and at thisspeed, the boats made about 10 knots.  There was likely  acurrent to the south of about two knots so the speed "over theground" was nearer 12 knots.  The run south was uneventfulthroughout the day and as the afternoon wore on, the line abreast wasslightly ragged.  F-2 was to seaward standing to the south oncourse 142°T about ten nautical miles off La Jolla light.  F-3was two point forward of the F-2's port beam at a range of about 7000yards.  F-1 was about 2000 yards astern of F-3 on a bearing of007°T from F-3.

Sunset occured about 1630 the eveningof 17 December 1917 and it was fully dark abour 1715.   The orders to the flotilla were to maintain speed  as per theengineering run plan on course 142°T until abeam of La Jolla lightthen to stand out to sea to avoid fog then to come around to such acourse that would bring them to San Pedro by about 1000 the nextmorning.  The ships were, even though together, were operatingindependently, not in formation.  Each ship was to inform theothers of course changes and speed changes.  Each of the shipscruised through the calm sea with running lights on.

The F-Class had been designed withouta bridge as we see on later submarines.  The crews had a pipeand rail rig made up to which a canvas screen  was lashed. This provided some protection from the wind and occasional spray. The captain "  " and the Officer of the Deck " "were on the bridge as well as two lookouts.  "" was inthe connning tower.  Engine orders were shouted down the hatchto the connning tower. There was a helm stand on the bridge thatconnected via a linkage through the hull to the internal steeringstand.   Air was being drawn into the ship for the enginesthrough the air induction and through the conning tower hatch. All seemed routine but the Captain was aware of the impending dangerof nightime maneuver near land in the fog and at night.

About 1830, the ships began to runinto fog that soon became thick..  F-1 changed course to 165°T to stand away from La Jolla and Point Loma.  Being the aft mostship, she would pass astern of F-3. A radio message was sent toindicate the course change but it was evidently not received byeither of F-1's companions.    The OOD of  F-2 was mindful of the two ships on his port hand.   At 1855 heturned F-2 to the west to clear the fog and to clear the area intowhich F-1 and F-3 would maneuver. F-2 would stand out to sea clear ofthe fog then turn north for the return trip along course 322°  Just after 1900 F-3 put on 10° right rudder and began a turn to areciprocal course of 322°.  The intention was to reversecourse, run to the north out of the fog and back toward San Pedro. The assumption made was that F-1 was still to port and astern. F-3' s radio operator started to try to raise F-1 and F-2 on theradio to inform them of the course change and intentions.

F-3 was coming slowly about and wascrossing 310° when, at about 1912, her lookouts and OOD sighted themasthead and port running light of another ship closing at a combinedspeed of nearly 20 knots.  The OOD screamed for F-3's helmsmanto  put her rudder hard over  to turn faster to starboardand for the engines to be reversed.   The other ship wascrossing F-3's bow from starboard to port.  The other ship wasF-1 running to the south on 165°   Seeing the lights ofF-3 looming out of the fog, F-1's skipper  tried to come tostarboard.  The combination of efforts was too slow to doanything but make the collision worse by placing the ships at more ofa right angle.  The resulting collision was deadly.

F-3 struck F-1  on the port sidesome 15' aft of the shears near the bulkhead between control and theengine room.  The stiff stem of F-3 and the rounded torpedo tubebow cap punched a three foot wide by ten foot high hole in the upperhull of F-1 driving all the way into the superstructure.  F-1rolled to starboard throwing all four men who were on the smallcanvas and pipe bridge into the sea.  F-3 pulled out of the holewith the screws reversed.  Not being pushed anymore,  F-1rolled back to port and started to flood fast.  The man inF-1's  conning tower, seeing the water coming in below himclimbed out and went overside. No one else escaped.  Someone inthe engine room  tried to open the hatch to get out but the shipwas sinking fast and water pressure on the outside kept it shut untilit was too late.  Those in the forward end of the boat had nochance.  Nineteen men went down with the ship.  The five in the water were picked up  by F-3 and she made her way back toSan Pedro.

In October, 1975, the USNS De Steiguer(T-AGOS-12) was using some new equipment to search for an F-4Jaircraft known to have crashed in the sea off Point Loma.  Herside scan sonar spotted what appeared to be a submarine in 635' ofwater.  The hull was photographed by CURV II and again on 24October 1975 by DSRV-2.  It was positively identified as F-1. The boat is laying on its starboard side with the hole made by F-3clearly visible.  The hull is in amazingly good shape and servesas  deep gravesite for the US Naval Submarine Force's firstwartime submarine loss.

We should be changing all references tothe number of wartime losses in the US Submarine Force to fifty threeas the number of fifty two is just wrong.

Very Respectfully

Jim Christley EMCS(SS) USN(ret)

St Augustine, FL